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I.  COMPETING CLAIMS OF BONDHOLDERS AND RESIDENTS 
In 1873, the city of Duluth issued bonds to improve its harbor and 
to create other municipal improvements.1  The bonds were payable 
between twenty and thirty years from their date of issue and bore an 
interest rate of seven percent.2  Shortly after their issuance, Duluth 
fell on difficult times.  The company of the financier Jay Cooke failed, 
and with it Cooke’s plans to transform Duluth into the eastern termi-
nus and port facility for the Northern Pacific Railroad.3  The popula-
tion of the city decreased from 5,000 to 1,500 and those who remained 
were reluctant to dedicate the few tax dollars left to payment of debt 
service for bondholders.4  The state legislature came to the residents’ 
rescue.  It carved from the boundaries of Duluth an area comprising 
“all the business part of the city and business houses, the harbor, rail-
road depots and tracks, nearly all the dwelling-houses, all the popula-
tion except about [one hundred] inhabitants, and nineteen-twentieths 
of all the taxable property,” and designated that area as the new vil-
 
∗ Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, NYU School of Law.  Thanks to 
Richard Schragger and to other participants in the Cooper-Walsh Colloquium at 
Fordham Law School for comments on earlier drafts. 
 1. Brewis v. City of Duluth, 9 F. 747, 748 (D. Minn. 1881). 
 2. Id. 
 3. ERIC H. MONKKONEN, THE LOCAL STATE: PUBLIC MONEY AND AMERICAN 
CITIES 82–83 (1995).  
 4. Id. at 83. 
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lage of Duluth.5  The legislature also directed that service of process 
in any lawsuit against Duluth be made on the mayor, but then effec-
tively terminated the incumbent mayor without making any provision 
for a replacement.6  Finally, the legislature apportioned responsibility 
for the outstanding bonds between the city and the new village.7 
Bondholders objected, especially when the city failed to make 
payments on its outstanding obligations.8  The bondholders thought 
they had found their own savior in the federal district court.9  While 
that court agreed that the state legislature was free to rearrange mu-
nicipal boundaries, it initially held that allowing rearrangements 
without providing for payment of creditors of the predecessor munic-
ipality “would be a mockery of justice” and overruled a demurrer in-
terposed by the village with respect to overdue payments on city 
bonds.10  After a full trial, however, the court concluded that the evi-
dence revealed that the city, even as redrawn by the legislature, ulti-
mately had “ample means . . . to meet the plaintiff’s demand,” a result 
that the court speculated was “largely due . . . to the successful opera-
tion” performed by the legislature.11  As a result, there was no reason 
to interfere with the apportionment of city debt that the legislature 
had mandated.12 
The efforts of the Minnesota Legislature were not ignored by other 
states that similarly sought to assist distressed municipalities against 
the demands of bondholders.  The Alabama Legislature restructured 
the city of Mobile into a new entity designated as the Port of Mobile 
in an effort to frustrate bondholders of the former by denying them 
access to taxes raised by the latter.13  The Supreme Court invalidated 
that effort in an opinion that appeared to be based on the federal 
Constitution’s Contracts Clause,14 although that clause was not in-
voked by name.15  The Court’s intervention was also required to nulli-
fy Illinois legislation that withdrew from municipalities taxing power 
 
 5. Brewis, 9 F. at 748. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at 749–50. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Brewis v. City of Duluth, 13 F. 334, 335 (D. Minn. 1882).   
 12. Id. at 337. 
 13. Port of Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 290 (1886). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.1. 
 15. Watson, 116 U.S. at 305. 
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necessary to pay outstanding bonds16 and to limit the ability of the 
legislature to divert from bondholders taxes collected by a municipali-
ty prior to legislative repeal of its charter.17 
These cases entail very different legal doctrines that, narrowly con-
strued, address very different situations.  Nevertheless, they, along 
with doctrines that I discuss below and that affect the validity of mu-
nicipal obligations, share a common theme that warrants their collec-
tive consideration.  They all illustrate a contest that threatens to be-
come all too familiar as the current fiscal crisis continues to engulf 
municipal budgets: the effort to resolve competing claims by bond-
holders and residents to a limited municipal treasury.  One might be-
lieve that the outcome of these contests had been resolved contractu-
ally when the debts that generate them were initially incurred.  
Implicit allocations of risk may arise from a variety of background le-
gal rules that relate to municipal indebtedness.  Issuers of general ob-
ligation bonds, those payable from municipal revenues generally, ra-
ther than from a specified source, pledge their “full faith and credit” 
to repayment,18 and the content of that pledge may be thought to im-
ply an obligation to pay bondholders prior to competing claimants.  A 
preference for bondholder claims over those of residents may also be 
inferred from the provision of the Bankruptcy Code that permits dis-
tressed municipalities to exit bankruptcy only when a proposed plan 
serves the “best interests of creditors.”19  The content of that test is 
less definite in the municipal context than in the private sector, since 
the former does not entail an option of liquidation,20 which could be 
used to determine whether a proposed plan makes creditors better off 
than an alternative resolution.  As a result, bankruptcy courts must 
balance the propriety of imposing tax increases or service reductions 
on residents21 against the propriety of compromising obligations to 
 
 16. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (1866). 
 17. Id.; see also Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880). 
 18. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FI-
NANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 27 (1996) 
 19. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7). 
 20. Michael M. McConnell & Randall C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Con-
ceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 465 (1993). 
 21. As a technical matter, bankruptcy courts cannot “impose” tax increases or 
service reductions on municipalities. See 11 U.S.C. § 903.  But they may do indirectly 
what they cannot do directly by withholding confirmation of a plan offered by a mu-
nicipality that does not include tax increases or service reductions. See Clayton P. 
Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and the Strategic Use of Municipal Bank-
ruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 283 (2012) [hereinafter Gillette, Fiscal Federalism]; 
McConnell & Picker, supra note 20, at 474. 
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bondholders.  The mandate of the “best interests of creditors” test ar-
guably strikes that balance in favor of the latter. 
One could imagine that a consistent conception of the priorities be-
tween bondholders and residents would inform all of these doctrines.  
Although individual circumstances or the details of specific contrac-
tual arrangements might be cause for some deviation from the norm, 
a default rule favoring either creditors or residents would inform all 
parties involved in the extension of credit to a municipality of the risk 
allocation faced in the event that the debtor municipality incurs fiscal 
distress.  That default rule, if based on some overall objective for the 
allocation of the risk of fiscal distress, could alleviate the vagaries in-
herent in the various legal principles that are invoked when munici-
palities seek relief from obligations that have become burdensome.  
The desirability of such a background default is apparent from the 
debates that characterize the Duluth litigation with which I began.  
One might believe that the strong version of the Contracts Clause ju-
risprudence that is frequently invoked when municipalities seek relief 
from contractual obligations reveals an unwavering policy of confer-
ring on bondholders priority over residents.22  But even in the nine-
teenth century, application of the various legal doctrines that affected 
the relative rights of bondholders and residents complicated any ef-
fort to discern a general priority principle.  State courts, as well as leg-
islatures, often exhibited little sympathy for bondholders when mu-
nicipal projects went financially awry.  State courts articulated a 
“public purpose” doctrine that placed restrictions on the use that lo-
calities could make of borrowed funds.  Although the doctrine initial-
ly received a broad definition, so that assistance to privately held en-
terprises, such as railroads, could fall within its scope,23 subsequent 
courts employed the doctrine to invalidate outstanding bonds as hav-
ing been issued for projects outside governmental competence once it 
became clear that the costs of those projects would exceed any related 
increase in municipal revenues.  The Iowa Supreme Court reversed24 
its earlier approval25 of railroad aid bonds, after the demise of rail-
roads whose commercial success was expected to render payment of 
the bonds painless.  Other state courts similarly construed municipal 
authority narrowly in order to invalidate bonds issued for purposes 
 
 22. See, e.g., Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853).   
 23. Id.   
 24. Stokes v. County of Scott, 10 Iowa 166 (1859); see also Iowa ex rel. Burlington 
& Mo. River R.R. v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862).  
 25. Dubuque Co. v. Dubuque & Pacific R.R. Co., 4 Greene 1 (Iowa 1853). 
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that the courts had previously blessed.26  In what is perhaps the best 
history of the railroad bond era, A. M. Hillhouse, somewhat derisive-
ly laid these reversals at the feet of an elected state judiciary whose 
terms in office depended on solicitude for an electorate unwilling or 
unable to satisfy obligations incurred in its name: “Decisions in favor 
of the bondholders by the state could not long stand in the face of 
hostile public opinion. . . . If the courts were not in agreement with 
public opinion, was this not plain evidence that they had been ‘bought 
up’ by the railroads?  So reasoned the rural mind.”27  Ultimately, an-
imosity towards bond issues spilled over from judicial willingness to 
invalidate outstanding indebtedness and into an unwillingness to 
permit municipalities to incur obligations in the first instance, even if 
nullification required some judicial creativity.  The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, for example, enjoined one issue of bonds that was to be 
used to aid a railroad on the grounds that residents had signed the au-
thorizing petition on a Sunday.28 
Hillhouse and Charles Fairman have recounted the struggle be-
tween state and federal courts in which (in pre-Erie days) the latter 
intervened to prevent invalidation of bonds held by non-residents 
whose efforts at obtaining payment were disappointed by the home-
ward trend of the former.29  Even the Supreme Court got into the act.  
While the Contracts Clause literally applies only to a state’s ability to 
“pass any law” that impairs the obligation of contract, in Gelpcke v. 
Dubuque, the Supreme Court appeared to apply that same under-
standing to state judicial decisions that had the effect of invalidating 
bonds issued under a previous interpretation of state law.30  Residents 
of Dubuque had voted to allow the city to subscribe to the bonds of 
two railroads.31 Under state supreme court precedent in effect at the 
time of issuance, state law authorized such investments.32  Subsequent 
to issuance of the city’s bonds, the state supreme court overruled its 
prior decisions and held that municipal investments in railroad aid 
were constitutionally prohibited.33  The Court determined that the re-
versals by the state supreme court stood out “in unenviable solitude 
 
 26. See, e.g., Perrin v. City of New London, 30 N.W. 623 (Wis. 1886). 
 27. A. M. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS 161 (1936). 
 28. De Forth v. Wis. & Minn. R. Co., 9 N.W. 17, 19 (Wis. 1881).   
 29. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88 Part One 935–1116 (1971).   
 30. 68 U.S. 175 (1863). 
 31. Id. at 202–03. 
 32. See id. at 203–04. 
 33. Id. at 205. 
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and notoriety.”34  Even if the state court’s decision had been rational, 
the Supreme Court concluded that it could not affect the validity of 
outstanding bonds issued under the prior interpretation of state au-
thority.35  The principle (if not the explicit Constitutional clause) that 
precludes impairment of a contract by subsequent legislative acts sim-
ilarly “applies where there is a change of judicial decision as to the 
constitutional power of the legislature to enact the law.”36  Even if the 
principle did not rest on federal constitutional grounds, it did “rest[] 
upon the plainest principles of justice.”37 
In light of decisions like Gelpcke, it is plausible that one could in-
terpret judicial interventions in favor of bondholders as extending be-
yond the narrow Contracts Clause issue.  Instead, the cases might ad-
umbrate a general principle that gives holders of validly issued bonds 
priority over countervailing claims on municipal revenues.  Resolu-
tion of competing claims to a limited municipal treasury during the 
Depression, however, suggested some retreat from that absolutist po-
sition.38  Claims that debts had been invalidly incurred had declined, 
perhaps due to the emergence of bond counsel, who provided pro-
spective bondholders with assurances that the bonds satisfied legal 
prerequisites to issuance.  Thus, state courts were more constrained in 
their ability to nullify outstanding bonds.  Nevertheless, fiscally dis-
tressed localities did not necessarily want to provide full payment to 
creditors in an environment in which municipal services were under-
funded or where tax increases might induce either exit or non-
payment by residents.39  Any sense that bondholders were entitled to 
priority over competing claims dissipated for two reasons.  First, given 
the general principle that tangible municipal assets are not available 
to satisfy judgment creditors, the entitlement would have to be en-
forced by legal actions to collect taxes, and courts exercised their dis-
cretion over writs of mandamus, or other equitable remedies, to sub-
 
 34. Id. at 206.   
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. See Defoe v. Town of Rutherfordton, 122 F.2d 342, 342–44 (4th Cir. 1941) 
(granting writ to bondholder because the town was merely “less able to meet its obli-
gations”); Simonton v. City of Pontiac, 255 N.W. 608, 613 (Mich. 1934) (upholding 
city’s debt obligations despite city’s impoverished condition); Little River Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 141, 143 (Fla. 1932) (concluding that “upon the exhaus-
tion of . . . tax levy, the general revenues of the municipality can be drawn upon to 
meet these [bond] obligations.”). 
 39. See e.g., Simonton, 255 N.W. at 611–12; Florida ex rel. Dos Amigos, Inc. v. 
Lehman, 131 So. 533, 536 (Fla. 1930).  
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ordinate bondholders to the interests of impoverished municipali-
ties.40  Writs of mandamus ran against individual officers of the mu-
nicipalities, who made a practice of avoiding them by resigning of-
fice.41  Courts also refused to grant the writs to impose taxes in excess 
of a state constitutional debt limitation,42 or to allow seizure of munic-
ipal property.43 
Second, legislatures intervened once more, but this time to adjust, 
not repudiate, debts.  Legislatures were likely emboldened by Su-
preme Court approval of state emergency authority that made credi-
tor rights under the Contracts Clause less ironclad than previous 
opinions had suggested.44  In perhaps the most notable example, the 
New Jersey legislature enacted a law that permitted an insolvent mu-
nicipality and its creditors to adjust claims against insolvent munici-
palities within the state.45  The legislation did not permit any reduc-
tion of principal, but did include a cramdown provision with respect 
to dissenters if eighty-five percent in amount of the creditors ap-
proved a plan, which could include an extension of the maturity 
date.46  The city of Asbury Park defaulted on its obligations after 
what the Supreme Court described as “a familiar picture of optimistic 
and extravagant municipal expansion caught in the destructive grip of 
general economic depression.”47  The city and the requisite percent-
age of creditors agreed to exchange their bonds for new obligations 
that would mature at a later date and bear a lower interest rate.48  But 
the dissenting bondholders maintained that the cramdown provision 
bound them to a restructuring that violated the Contracts Clause.49 
This time, the Supreme Court provided less of a refuge for the ag-
grieved bondholders.  The Court concluded that imposing such a bur-
den on dissenting bondholders did not unconstitutionally impair the 
 
 40. See, e.g., Rutherfordton, 122 F.2d at 345. 
 41. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 511 
(1942). 
 42. Cf. Little River Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 141, 143 (Fla. 1932). 
 43. See, e.g., Gwen T. Coffin, Enforcement of Judgments Against Municipal Cor-
porations, 17 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 226, 233 (1939).   
 44. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442–44 (1934).   
 45. The current version of the statutory scheme can be found at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
52:27 (2011).  As discussed below, it is doubtful that the state provision concerning 
composition of indebtedness survives the current Bankruptcy Code. 
 46. Id. § 52:27-36; see also id. §§ 52:27-34–39. 
 47. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 503 (1942).   
 48. See id. at 507. 
 49. Id. 
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obligation of contract.50  Instead, the Court concluded that the care-
fully crafted51 congressional enactment of a federal municipal bank-
ruptcy law should not be interpreted to preclude a state from devising 
its own plan for resolving the fiscal distress of its political subdivi-
sions.52  Congress ultimately disagreed with Justice Frankfurter’s in-
terpretation that it had intended to preserve for the states a residual 
debt restructuring power over their own municipalities.  Section 
903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code embodies precisely the result that Jus-
tice Frankfurter deemed unfathomable, as it prohibits a state from 
prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness that binds non-
consenting creditors.53 
The Depression experience with municipal distress, therefore, 
eliminated any thought that different legal doctrines affecting the pri-
ority of bondholders and residents could be reduced to a simple allo-
cation of entitlements that would bring certainty to the area.  The 
Court’s Contracts Clause cases transformed the clear rule of prior 
cases into a vague standard that relies on the background circum-
stances of the legislative intervention, the alternative recourse availa-
ble to bondholders, and the willingness of the court to exercise discre-
tion over the use of municipal resources.  At the same time, judicial 
refusal to treat bond obligations as embodying a guarantee to pay 
debts meant that state legal doctrines could not be relied on to pro-
vide a clear priority between municipal residents and creditors where 
municipal resources were too constrained to satisfy both.  That ambi-
guity prevailed even where municipalities provided bondholders with 
a pledge of its municipality’s “faith and credit.”  That pledge has been 
variously interpreted as something close to a “good faith” effort to 
use municipal resources to pay debt service54—an effort that munici-
 
 50. See id. at 509–14. 
 51. The bankruptcy law had been drafted to avoid interference with state control 
over its municipalities by requiring state permission for a municipality to file a peti-
tion for debt adjustment. 
 52. See Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 515–16. 
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 903 provides: 
[T]his chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by 
legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of 
the political or governmental powers of such municipality, including ex-
penditures for such exercise, but— 
(1) a State law prescribing method of composition of indebtedness of such 
municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such com-
position . . . . 
 54. See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Spink, 303 P.2d 46 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1956); State v. City of Lakeland, 16 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 1944).  
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palities may have to abandon should municipal services be seriously 
threatened—and as something closer to an absolute obligation that 
requires the locality even to exceed tax limitations to ensure that 
bondholders receive their promised payments.55 
The New York Court of Appeals came close to clarifying priorities 
between the claims of bondholders and residents, at least in that state, 
during the 1970s fiscal crisis in New York City.56  Ultimately, howev-
er, that court simply reinforced the ambiguities in the general juris-
prudence concerning the contest.57  When the city was on the verge of 
 
 55. See Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848, 851 (N.Y. 
1976).   
Indeed, uncertainty about priorities exists even in bankruptcy proceedings involving 
insolvent municipalities.  The absolute priority rule, which applies in Chapter 9 as a 
formal matter, 11 U.S.C. §§ 901, 1129(b)(2)(A), (B), does not give creditors any par-
ticular solace.  In corporate bankruptcy, the absolute priority rule—which requires 
that senior creditors receive full payment before other creditors or claimants receive 
any payment—induces shareholders to satisfy creditors in full in order to enjoy any 
residual value of the firm.  Municipal residents, however, qualify neither as share-
holders nor as creditors.  Thus, they are not subject to the absolute priority claims of 
bondholders and, as a political matter, residents can demand that municipal funds be 
dedicated to the provision of public goods and services before being allocated to the 
payment of debt service.  Nor is it necessarily advantageous to subordinate residents’ 
claims to those of bondholders.  Dedicating tax revenues to creditors rather than to 
municipal activities will dilute residents’ incentives to engage in municipally produc-
tive behavior and will likely induce residents to withhold tax payments from which 
they anticipate receiving little benefit. See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Rem-
edies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 653 (2008); McConnell & 
Picker, supra note 20, at 470.  Further, there are no legal principles requiring that 
bondholders subordinate their interests to residents, and potential creditors retain a 
credible threat to withhold badly needed capital from local governments insufficient 
solicitous of bondholder demands.  One might think that the prohibition on court in-
tervention in the political or financial affairs of the bankrupt municipality would pro-
vide the latter with substantial leverage in dealing with bondholders, notwithstanding 
the absence of an absolute priority rule.  But, as many have pointed out, the formal 
prohibition is far weaker in practice, since courts retain substantial discretion to in-
fluence the political and financial decisions of the bankrupt municipality by virtue of 
their judicial capacity to serve as gatekeeper over such issues as qualification for 
bankruptcy and confirmation of the plan that the municipality must propose to exit 
bankruptcy. See David L. Dubrow, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Op-
tion for Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis?, 24 URB. LAW 539 (1992); McConnell & Pick-
er, supra note 20, at 466.  The former allows courts to determine that a municipality is 
not “insolvent” because it retains taxing capacity, while the latter permits the court to 
conclude that a municipality that fails to exercise additional taxing authority has not 
proposed a plan that satisfies the “best interests of the creditors” requirement.  Each 
of these provides opportunities to bondholders to exercise leverage over municipali-
ties, and reduces any certainty that might otherwise exist about who wins the contest 
between bondholders and residents. 
 56. Flushing, 358 N.E.2d 848.   
 57. Id. 
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default, the state attempted to shift some losses from residents to 
creditors.58  In an effort to employ some variation on the Asbury Park 
experience, the New York legislature enacted a Moratorium Act that 
altered the terms of New York City notes.59  The legislature presuma-
bly believed that a fiscal emergency of the nature that New York City 
faced satisfied the conditions that allowed Justice Frankfurter to 
overcome concerns about federal constraints on the impairment of 
contracts.60  But the New York Court of Appeals never got to that 
point.  The court instead inferred from state constitutional provisions, 
such as admonitions to pay debt service even if tax limitations had to 
be exceeded, that creditors held an absolute right to payment, pre-
sumably without regard for the consequences on the issuing locality.61  
Thus, the bondholders appeared entitled to priority in the event of 
limited funds to satisfy all claimants. 
What the Court of Appeals gave with one hand, however, it with-
drew with the other.  The court ostensibly did not want to authorize 
creditors to bankrupt the city in order to obtain payment.  Once it ar-
ticulated a clear entitlement in favor of creditors, the court expressed 
an unwillingness to enforce it.62  Instead, the court implicitly author-
ized creditors to use their entitlement to negotiate an appropriate set-
tlement with the state and city.  Perhaps it is the equivalent of what 
the European Union has been attempting to accomplish by negotiat-
ing the appropriate level of losses that holders of Greek bonds should 
absorb without rendering that country’s debt burden 
nonsustainable.63  The court concluded that it would “be injudicious 
at this time to allow the extraordinary remedies in the nature of in-
junction and peremptory mandamus sought by plaintiff” that one 
might have thought should flow automatically once the court an-
 
 58. See id. at 857. 
 59. See id. at 850–57 (quoting New York City Emergency Moratorium, 1975 N.Y. 
Laws ch. 874, as amd. by ch. 875).  The full Act is available at http://newman.baruch. 
cuny.edu/digital/2003/amfl/mac/pdf_files/Legislation_State/1975-1.pdf. 
 60. See supra notes 47–52 (discussing the Court’s holding in Faitoute Iron & Steel 
Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942)). 
 61. Flushing, 358 N.E.2d at 852. 
 62. Id. at 855 (“[Noteholders of the city are entitled to some judicial relief free of 
throttling by the moratorium statute, but they are not entitled immediately to ex-
traordinary or any particular judicial measures unnecessarily disruptive of the city’s 
delicate financial and economic balance.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Richard Barley, Greece’s Haircut May Not Go Far Enough, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020355410457700 
1752824131834.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories. 
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nounced the assignment of priority to creditors.64  The court then 
noted that the legislature would soon be in session and would “be in a 
position once again to treat with the city’s problems and to seek a fis-
cal solution in the light of the holding in this case.”65  In effect, the 
court was assigning an entitlement and allowing the parties to bargain 
around it.  By imposing on the city the obligation to pay, rather than 
allowing the city to shift losses to bondholders, the city was required 
to purchase from bondholders the entitlement to receive payment.  
Given endowment effects, the price of that purchase would presuma-
bly be greater than if the bondholders had to purchase the right to 
payment from the city.  Nevertheless, the right to payment that the 
court had endorsed up to the penultimate paragraph of its opinion66 
appeared much less secure in the face of “the city’s grave fiscal and 
economic problems.”67 
Not all courts have demonstrated similar solicitude for bondhold-
ers when resolving ambiguities in legal doctrines deployed to address 
municipal fiscal crisis.  The railroad aid era, in which a capital-
intensive industry enjoyed substantial municipal assistance before the 
reality of overinvestment defeated expectations, had a parallel in the 
late twentieth century rush to construct power plants, largely funded 
by municipal bonds.68  The financial arrangements that characterized 
these obligations perhaps gave some pause to those involved in their 
issuance, in large part because prospective bondholders who might 
have been reluctant to accept the limited security of promises to pay 
from revenues generated by operation of controversial generating 
plants demanded that their bonds carry some additional guaranty of 
payment.  But guaranties gave rise to fear that post-issuance chal-
lenges to the bonds could revive the kinds of claims of invalidity that 
haunted railroad aid bonds a century prior.  As a result, the issuance 
of bonds for the projects was, in many jurisdictions, preceded by some 
form of test case to determine the validity of the debts incurred to 
construct and operate the plants. 
 
 64. Flushing, 358 N.E.2d at 855.   
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. (“The notes in suit provided that the city pledged its faith and credit to 
pay the notes and to pay them punctually when due. The clause and the constitution-
al mandate have no office except when their enforcement is inconvenient. A neutral 
court worthy of its status cannot do less than hold what is so evident.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Johnson v. Piedmont Mun. Power Agency, 287 S.E.2d 476 (S.C. 
1982); State ex rel. Mitchell v. City of Sikeston, 555 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); 
Opinion of the Justices, 319 So. 2d 699 (Ala. 1975). 
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But some issuers, either more courageous or less cautious, entered 
the bond markets without a test of validity.69  When those plants 
proved either unnecessary or substantially more costly than anticipat-
ed, courts again were called on to arbitrate the claims of bondholders 
and ratepayers about how to allocate the risks of fiscal myopia.70  In 
1983, the Washington Public Power Supply System committed the 
largest default that had occurred in the municipal securities market 
when it failed to pay debt service on $2.25 billion of bonds issued to 
finance nuclear power plants in the Pacific Northwest.71  The bonds 
were payable from utility payments that were to be made by ratepay-
ers to participant municipalities that had agreed to take energy from 
the financed plants.72  The predicted demand for electrical energy that 
had led to the efforts to construct the plants never materialized, and 
the ultimate construction and operating costs made the electricity that 
they would have generated more expensive than alternatives.73  Rate-
payer reactions to dramatic increases in their utility charges induced 
the participating municipalities to challenge the validity of the con-
tracts under which they had agreed to charge their residents a rate 
that reflected construction costs, even if plants never generated any 
electricity.74  The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that alt-
hough the municipalities were authorized to purchase electricity, they 
were not authorized to purchase a chance of obtaining electricity, and 
thus the contracts were ultra vires and invalid.75  The Supreme Court 
of Idaho followed suit.76  The Oregon Supreme Court appeared to 
take the high road.  It held that the obligations incurred by ratepayers 
were not the equivalent of taxes and thus bonds issued to fund the 
plants did not exceed state constitutional debt limitations.77  The 
court chastised its Pacific Northwest brethren for failing to enforce 
contractual obligations under their states’ constitutional provisions.78  
But, the court concluded, since other courts had failed to require 
 
 69. See, e.g., Asson v. City of Burley, 670 P.2d 839 (Idaho 1983); Chemical Bank 
v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1983). 
 70. See e.g., Asson, 670 P.2d 839; Chemical Bank, 666 P.2d 329. 
 71. See Chemical Bank, 666 P.2d 329; DANIEL POPE, NUCLEAR IMPLOSIONS: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM 6–7 (2008). 
 72. See Chemical Bank, 666 P.2d at 332–33. 
 73. See generally id. 
 74. See POPE, supra note 71, at 156. 
 75. See Chemical Bank, 666 P.2d at 342. 
 76. Asson v. City of Burley, 670 P.2d 839, 850 (Idaho 1983). 
 77. De Fazio v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 679 P.2d 1316, 1344 (Or. 1984) (en 
banc). 
 78. Id. at 1327–28. 
GILLETTE_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:22 AM 
2012] FINANCIALLY STRESSED MUNICIPALITIES 651 
payments to bondholders, Oregonians could not be left with the en-
tire burden.79  Thus, Oregon localities, regretfully, would not be bur-
dened with their contracts either. 
In a similar case of cost overruns, a nuclear power plant in New 
Hampshire that was to supply energy to municipalities in the north-
east became less desirable than initially anticipated.80  Municipalities 
in Vermont that had contractually ceded their rate-setting to a co-
owner of the plant sought to avoid contracts compelling them to 
charge residents rates sufficient to pay debt service on outstanding 
bonds, including bonds issued to finance the unforeseen construction 
costs.81  The Vermont Supreme Court invalidated the contracts, 
deeming the concession of rate-setting authority to a third party an 
unconstitutional delegation of municipal authority.82  As in the Wash-
ington Public Power Supply System cases, any insufficiencies in reve-
nues that resulted from the inability to collect rate payments would 
impose on bondholders a risk of nonpayment that they believed had 
been contractually shifted to resident ratepayers. 
A few states, however, have enacted statutory regimes that leave 
little ambiguity about the priority between bondholders and residents 
in the event of municipal fiscal distress.  These statutes, perhaps sur-
prisingly, assign the entitlement to bondholders.  For example, Vir-
ginia requires the state to pay the holder of any general obligation 
bond of a locality that is in default and to withhold all payments of 
state funds to the locality until the default is cured.83  Rhode Island 
has arguably gone further.  When the city of Central Falls encoun-
tered economic hardship sufficient to warrant appointment of a re-
ceiver, and a bankruptcy filing seemed plausible, the legislature en-
acted a statute that purports to transform the city’s tax receipts into a 
revenue stream on which bondholders have a statutory lien.84  The ef-
fect of the statute is to allow the bondholders to have priority in the 
city’s tax revenue stream during bankruptcy proceedings, and to deny 
the municipality the capacity to give priority to other claimants on tax 
funds, such as city employees or pensioners.85  The statutory alloca-
 
 79. Id. at 1344–45. 
 80. Vt. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 215 (Vt. 
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).   
 81. Id. at 216–17. 
 82. Id. at 220. 
 83. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2659 (2000). 
 84. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1 (2011).  
 85. Indeed, states frequently provide bondholders of state and local debt  assur-
ances of payment.  Georgia’s constitution requires the legislature to impose taxes and 
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tion apparently was influential in persuading retirees in Central Falls 
to accept a plan that would reduce their pensions, but provide full 
payment to bondholders.86 
Other states that do not statutorily require payment to bondhold-
ers do authorize state takeovers or receiverships to facilitate ad hoc 
solutions that can be invoked in a manner that, in the short term, fa-
vors creditors over residents.87  Several states have standing statutes 
that permit receiverships of distressed municipalities or the appoint-
ment of financial control boards.  Pennsylvania’s Municipalities Fi-
nancial Recovery Act allows a financially distressed locality that has 
adopted a financial plan proposed by a state-appointed coordinator to 
exercise additional taxing authority.88  Michigan allows appointment 
of a financial emergency manager who essentially displaces elected 
officials and can exercise additional taxing or borrowing authority.89  
In each of these cases, the dilution of municipal authority is often 
combined with state capital infusions or other efforts to ensure credi-
tors of the continuing solvency of the municipality, rather than simply 
to provide residents with the means of avoiding pre-existing obliga-
tions.  When states trigger these statutes, they frequently do so not in 
the name of saving services for residents of the distressed locality, but 
in the name of securing the position of bondholders who might oth-
erwise be unwilling to extend credit to the city, neighboring localities, 
or the state itself.90 
Perhaps the historical variability in the assignment of legal priori-
ties to residents and bondholders is inevitable, particularly given the 
inherent ambiguity of the legal doctrines that are used to allocate the 
 
to appropriate funds necessary to pay outstanding general obligation bonds, and re-
quires the state fiscal officer to cure any deficiency in the bond’s sinking fund by set-
ting aside the first revenues thereafter received in the state’s general fund.  See GA. 
CONST. art. VII, § 4, para. 3.  Maryland requires that any debt be accompanied by a 
tax sufficient to pay principal and interest and prohibits the repeal of such tax or the 
diversion of its proceeds to other purposes until the debt has been discharged.  MD. 
CONST. art. III, § 34.  Minnesota requires the state auditor to levy an annual tax suffi-
cient to pay principal and interest on faith and credit bonds of the state that come 
due in the “ensuing year and to and including July 1 of the second ensuing year.” 
MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 86. See Michael Corkery, Pensions Chopped but Investors Paid, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 20, 2011, at C1.   
 87. Typically, even short term subordination of residents’ interests is justified by 
serving their long term interests in the continued access of their localities to capital 
markets.   
 88. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 11701.123, 11701.141 (West 1987).   
 89. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1519 (2011). 
 90. See supra note 88. 
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risk of distress.  Once one retreats from the position that the Con-
tracts Clause prohibits any modification of debts, the conditions for 
impairment become sufficiently flexible to permit states and localities 
that are so inclined to reduce obligations incurred during fiscally 
prosperous periods.  The same is true of legal doctrines concerning 
“debt” or “public purpose,” which issuers have invoked to avoid obli-
gations initially considered valid.  The willingness to deploy these 
doctrines may depend partially on politics, and partially on the desire 
of officials to address risks of moral hazard.  From an ex post perspec-
tive, it can be difficult to reverse engineer the motivations of the rele-
vant officials for deciding whether to repudiate debts in favor of their 
constituents or to risk greater local fiscal distress by enforcing obliga-
tions. 
Once fiscal distress materializes, local officials will want to main-
tain the political allegiance of their constituents, and thus have incen-
tives to externalize costs to non-resident bondholders.  Local officials 
may be able to convince state officials to provide relief, either by as-
sisting in the repudiation or restructuring of debts or by facilitating 
capital infusions that allow payment of debts with minimal local dis-
tress.  State officials, however, are likely to extract concessions that 
leave residents worse off as the price of assistance.  State officials 
have incentives both to avoid the moral hazard problem related to 
bailouts and to overcome bondholders’ reluctance to make further 
investments in a state that allowed default.  In those situations, state 
officials may wish to protect state interests against the risk of conta-
gion and, if the distressed municipality is of minor importance to their 
electoral success, may be able to do so without risking loss of political 
support from a needed political base.  The possibility that states will 
intercede with receiverships, control boards or other governing enti-
ties that are not directly elected by local constituents91 may increase 
where the party in power at the state level differs from the party in 
power at the local level.  Much of the debate about state intervention 
and municipal independence in situations such as Harrisburg and 
Bridgeport, for instance, was attributable to partisan politics.92  The 
 
 91. Because the receiverships, control boards, or other governing entities are not 
beholden to the local voters, there is an increased potential to favor bondholders 
over residents. See, e.g., 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1170.123, 1170.141 (West 1987). 
 92. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Fil-
ing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. 
J. 625 (1995); Sabrina Tavernise, Pennsylvania’s Capital City Files for Bankruptcy, 
HERALD-TRIBUNE (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20111012/ 
ZNYT02/110123012.  
GILLETTE_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:22 AM 
654 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
bondholder community93 is likely to have both the financial where-
withal and the opportunities for repeat play to persuade either local 
or state officials that their political reputations and the long-term in-
terests of their constituents require allocating the risks of fiscal dis-
tress to taxpayers rather than to bondholders who may subsequently 
refuse to invest in the state, or to do so only at rates that reflect a 
higher likelihood of subsequent defaults. 
Even apolitical officials, however, could favor bondholders over 
residents if they feared that local defaults would impose additional 
costs on other localities or to the state itself.  The evidence of conta-
gion from local defaults is mixed, but, as I have suggested in recent 
work, the evidence of fear of contagion is somewhat robust.94  
Whether fear of contagion reflects a rational risk, or is only articulat-
ed as a pretext for favoritism of bondholders over residents based on 
some alternative objective, is a more difficult issue.  The presence of 
more robust capital markets than existed during earlier periods of 
municipal fiscal distress makes the risk of contagion more realistic, 
since prospective bondholders have greater choice among invest-
ments and can avoid risks related to issuers that are perceived as in 
danger of default. It is, therefore, difficult to use history to determine 
whether contagion or the possibility of partisan politics serve as a ba-
sis for allocating the risk of fiscal distress between residents and 
bondholders.  A default rule that transcends the various legal doc-
trines that address municipal fiscal crisis must be derived from some 
other principle. 
II.  ASSIGNING ENTITLEMENTS TO SUPERIOR MONITORS 
The litany of ways in which states and localities resolve conflicts 
between residents and bondholders reveals the ambiguities inherent 
in the relevant legal doctrines.  The resulting variety of decisions, 
however, can interfere with effective resolution of municipal distress, 
as uncertainty about entitlements is likely to increase both the time 
and costs of deciding how to allocate scarce resources.  Statutory allo-
cations of the risk of fiscal distress may bring more certainty to the 
process, and may reduce costs.  The clear assignment of priorities to 
bondholders in the Central Falls bankruptcy and pensioners’ subse-
quent acceptance has been viewed as an antidote to the protracted lit-
igation in the Vallejo, California bankruptcy, which is reported as 
 
 93. The bondholder community generally consists of financial institutions, in-
vestment bankers, and broker-dealers, as well as more far-flung individual investors. 
 94. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 21. 
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having consumed $10 million of city funds.95  But clarity does not nec-
essarily translate into an optimal assignment of the relevant risks.  
Flushing National Bank96 suggests that once legal entitlements are re-
solved, bargaining around them can occur, so that an initially subop-
timal assignment of entitlement can be corrected.  Nevertheless, the 
initial allocation of an entitlement is likely to affect the ultimate bar-
gain.  As the Central Falls situation suggests, assigning the entitle-
ment to bondholders allows them to demand a lower “haircut” before 
acceding to a plan for restructuring municipal debt, while assigning 
the entitlement to residents would confer on them equivalent lever-
age against creditors.  Transaction costs may deter bargains that 
would otherwise adjust entitlements more efficiently, and endowment 
effects may increase the reservation price demanded by initial holders 
above what they would be willing to pay to purchase the same enti-
tlement.97  As a consequence, initial entitlements matter, not only for 
the distribution of gains between the parties, but also for the willing-
ness of the parties to take measures that would have desirable social 
effects.  If, for instance, the objective of legal intervention in allocat-
ing the risk of fiscal distress is not merely to prioritize claims to a lim-
ited fund, but also to prevent the materialization of distress in the first 
instance, then it is worth considering whether the assignment of enti-
tlements in the face of potential default can affect that objective. 
In this Part, I suggest that legal rules allocating the risk of munici-
pal fiscal distress be viewed as a means to incentivize groups best po-
sitioned to detect or forestall fiscal distress.  If residents or bondhold-
ers enjoy an advantage in monitoring against fiscal distress, then 
assigning the entitlement to the other party induces the better posi-
tioned party to undertake the monitoring task.  If, for instance, bond-
holders are better positioned to monitor than residents, then assign-
ing priority to bondholders discourages them from taking advantage 
of that position (because they are more likely to receive payments 
even without monitoring), requires residents to purchase the entitle-
ment from bondholders (at a cost that includes the endowment effect 
inefficiently granted to bondholders), or requires residents to monitor 
at a cost higher than would be incurred by bondholders.  To enhance 
this objective, legal rules should place the risk on the superior moni-
 
 95. Bobby White, U.S. News: Bankruptcy Exit Approved for City, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 6, 2011, at A2. 
 96. 358 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1976).  
 97. The role of transaction costs and endowment effects are well rehearsed in the 
literature of contracting. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Le-
gal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1269–70 (2003).   
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tor in order to induce that group to take advantage of its position.  
Indeed, that same approach should reflect the results that residents 
and bondholders would reach if they were able to bargain ex ante 
about the consequences of fiscal distress.98  Rational creditors in such 
a bargain will demand interest rates that reflect the risk and costs that 
they would bear in the event of default.  Rational debtors would pre-
fer to bear those risks themselves and pay a lower interest rate if they 
were able to avoid default or its consequences at an expected cost less 
than what creditors would charge. 
The emphasis on monitoring is also consistent with explanations of 
how public credit can enhance local democratic institutions.  Credi-
tors typically prefer to control expenditures in order to ensure that 
debtors do not use borrowed funds for ventures other than those an-
ticipated at the time of the loan.  The emergence of democratic insti-
tutions is often attributed to efforts by executives who wanted to 
solve this contracting problem by conceding control over expenditure 
decisions to representative assemblies of creditors.99  But in more 
contemporary democracies, representative assemblies are composed 
of residents whose interests are not necessarily aligned with those of 
creditors.100  Where that is the case, delegation by public entities of 
control rights to private creditors is inconsistent with democratic gov-
ernance.  Creditors might attempt to write a complete contingent con-
tract detailing what debtors could do under any set of circumstances, 
but such a contract would be extremely costly to draft in light of 
events difficult to foresee at the time of contracting.  But representa-
tives, who are spending public money rather than their own may also 
favor expenditures for personal objectives rather than those of their 
constituents.  It is plausible that on some expenditure decisions, the 
interests of creditors and constituents are more closely aligned than 
those of representatives and constituents.  Representatives may dis-
cover that maximizing their personal objectives, such as attaining re-
election, attaining higher office, or attaining post-public service em-
ployment, requires allegiance to expenditures on behalf of discrete 
 
 98. Of course, residents and bondholders essentially bargain ex ante when local 
officials and underwriters negotiate the terms of a bond transaction or when under-
writers submit bids in a competitive auction of bonds. Agency costs inherent in repre-
sentation, however, may cause some deviation between an optimal allocation of risks 
and the one that the parties would directly negotiate if bargaining were costless.   
 99. See, e.g., DAVID STASAVAGE, STATES OF CREDIT: SIZE, POWER, AND THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN POLITICS 6–14 (2011).   
 100. Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 937, 943–44 (2008) [hereinafter Gillette, Public Debt]. 
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groups rather than to constituents as a whole, while creditors may dis-
cover that their interest in ensuring repayment of debts aligns well 
with the interest of constituents in the exercise of fiscal responsibility.  
One might think that residents would be in a good position to moni-
tor against fiscal irresponsibility.  After all, it is their funds that repre-
sentatives are spending.  It is, however, plausible that creditors, or 
some subgroup of them, has both greater incentive and capacity to 
monitor than do residents.  If so, and if the interests of creditors and 
residents are sufficiently aligned, then inducing the former group to 
serve as proxies for the latter would reduce overall monitoring costs 
while generating superior supervision of representatives. 
In what follows, therefore, I take an ex ante approach to the issue 
of whether residents or bondholders should enjoy the entitlement to 
priority in the event of municipal fiscal distress.  I conclude that, while 
bondholders suffer from significant disincentives and collective action 
problems that discourage monitoring, some financial intermediaries 
that act on behalf of bondholders already invest in monitoring local 
fiscal prudence in a manner that aligns with the interests of residents.  
Assigning priority to residents in the event of fiscal distress, therefore, 
would induce bondholders to ensure that those involved in the bond 
issuance process would exploit their monitoring capacity to avoid 
bondholder losses or provide ex ante compensation in the form of 
higher interest rates. 
If it seems peculiar to suggest that creditors may be better monitors 
of municipal officials than the residents who elect those officials, 
think about the analogous situations in which providers of services 
(creditors) are deemed to have better information about the use of 
those services than the users themselves (residents).  For instance, the 
Federal Communications Commission recently proposed that cell 
phone service providers notify cell phone users when they are about 
to approach their contractual time limits, although one might believe 
that the users themselves are well positioned to monitor their own us-
age.101  Similarly, Congress has mandated that credit card issuers con-
sider whether prospective card holders will be able to pay their 
bills,102 even though one might initially believe that applicants for 
cards are better monitors of their own financial wherewithal.  In both 
situations, the justification for the anti-intuitive regulation is that pro-
 
 101. See Press Release, FCC Proposes Rules to Help Mobile Phone Users Avoid 
“Bill Shock,” (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attach 
match/DOC-302192A1.pdf.   
 102. See Credit CARD Act of 2009, H.R. 627, 111th Cong. § 150 (2009).   
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viders have sufficient information about both the individual user and 
similarly situated users to make low-cost assessments about the user 
that are more accurate than the user’s own speculation.  In short, the 
assignment of priority to residents over creditors may reflect a stand-
ard resolution of a problem of asymmetric information in which we 
induce parties with superior information to disclose or act on that in-
formation in order to allocate risks that might otherwise fall on par-
ties less able to avoid or bear them. 
A. Residents as Monitors 
Any claim that bondholders should serve as monitors of the local 
treasury initially seems perplexing.  Residents, and homeowners in 
particular, appear to have both the incentive and advantage in moni-
toring.  Homeowners, whose largest asset frequently is immobile 
property, should want to protect the value of their homes from mu-
nicipal profligacy and high taxes that diminish resale value.103  Since 
even relatively mobile residents cannot exit costlessly,104 they should 
be willing to monitor against official misconduct to avoid paying for 
services that have value below their tax price. 
Nevertheless, as I have explored in earlier work, resident underin-
vestment in monitoring is a perfectly rational response, given the pub-
lic good nature of monitoring and the standard responses of individu-
als to problems that require collective action.105  Begin with the 
assumption that all residents prefer that their local officials exercise 
fiscal responsibility and define that objective similarly.  Even under 
those conditions, it would not be in the interest of any individual resi-
dent to monitor, because each can enjoy identical benefits without in-
curring the commensurate costs if some other resident monitors.  The 
great paradox of public goods provision is that, while the fact that 
governments that make decisions for the collective and impose taxes 
to pay for desired goods are traditionally seen as a solution to free 
riding that would otherwise occur, monitoring government itself pos-
sesses the characteristics of a public good.  If I monitor to ensure 
faithful government, I can neither exclude you from the benefits of 
 
 103. See WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES 
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE 
POLICIES 4–5 (2005).   
 104. Exiting a locale requires moving which entails, at a minimum, time to find a 
suitable alternative residence, time packing and unpacking, and transportation costs 
such as a moving company.  
 105. See Gillette, Public Debt, supra note 100.  
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my efforts nor force you to bear their costs.106  I am, therefore, likely 
to withhold those efforts in the hopes that someone else, on whom I 
can free ride, fills the gap. 
Of course, outside of relatively small, homogeneous localities, all 
residents will not posit the same objective for their local officials’ ex-
penditure decisions.  Some will prefer that the local budget be dedi-
cated to schools, some to parks, police, and fire protection.  The ob-
jectives of residents may also fluctuate with expected periods of resi-
residency, as those who anticipate emigrating within relatively short 
periods of time may prefer current capital expenditures, and hence 
more debt, for which (assuming imperfect capitalization) future resi-
dents will pay.  As a result, one resident cannot rely on monitoring by 
another, because the active resident might be monitoring for some 
objective that the free riding resident does not share.  The variety of 
objective functions, however, does not mean that we will get an opti-
mal level of monitoring.  To the contrary, it may mean that local offi-
cials have a greater capacity to deviate from the preferences of medi-
an voters.  There are numerous explanations for this phenomenon.  
First, the variety of plausible objectives means that local officials can 
justify any of a variety of expenditure decisions as a democratic re-
sponse to the expressed interests of at least some residents who have 
a view of the appropriate municipal objective function that differs 
from the interests of dissenting residents.  In short, the variety of 
plausible objectives that local officials can pursue obfuscates what it 
means for officials to act in a responsible manner.  Second, the variety 
of potentially appropriate local objectives means that when particular 
residents do monitor, it is not necessarily the case that they are repre-
sentative of the preferences of the locality as a whole.  Instead, they 
may be monitoring for an idiosyncratic expenditure rather than for 
fiscal responsibility generally.  A relatively small group that has an 
organizational advantage, perhaps because its members receive sub-
stantial and concentrated benefits from the proposed governmental 
action, may form a more effective lobbying group than the majority of 
residents who disfavor the action, but for whom the costs of active 
opposition exceed the costs they will incur if the proposal is adopt-
ed.107 
The problem obviously becomes worse once we relax the assump-
tion of publicly interested actors.  Residents (or nonresidents) who 
 
 106. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRA-
CY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURT 150–54 (2011). 
 107. Id. at 19–21.  
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seek special benefits that are inconsistent with the public interest typ-
ically pursue concentrated benefits through the imposition of diffuse 
costs in order to reduce the saliency of the costs to potential oppo-
nents..  Indeed, highly salient projects that are funded out of the local 
treasury, such as construction of sports stadiums, tend to create con-
troversy on all sides.108  And there may be times when even proposals 
for relatively small expenditures generate debate, perhaps because 
they would adversely affect one discrete, organized group even as 
they conferred benefits on another.  For instance, proposals to issue 
industrial development bonds to attract chain stores at subsidized 
rates are likely to stimulate organized opposition by existing inde-
pendent merchants with whom the newcomers will compete.109  But 
even these pockets of opposition do not necessarily serve the broader 
interests of the community.  Supporters of independent stores may 
successfully oppose the introduction of national chains on grounds 
that the latter are antithetical to a unique community identity.110  Yet 
such decisions may not reflect calculations of the relative efficiencies 
of larger stores, efficiencies that are substantial in the aggregate, but 
perhaps too speculative and small in individual cases to induce their 
beneficiaries to monitor local officials to ensure that the benefits are 
realized.111 
Indeed, the myriad objectives that localities attempt to satisfy sim-
ultaneously can transform the budgeting process into a means by 
which local officials consolidate political coalitions by directing funds 
to as many constituent groups as possible.  In the absence of hard 
budget constraints, the incentives of local officials to satisfy the de-
mands of potentially influential groups becomes a hallmark of fiscal 
irresponsibility.112  Hard budget constraints would facilitate monitor-
ing, in that the zero-sum nature of expenditures would induce each 
interested group to examine expenditures made to others in order to 
maximize its own share of the budget.  But even balanced budget re-
 
 108. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Another Big Idea Brought Down by Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at A1. 
 109. See WDW Properties v. City of Sumter, 535 S.E.2d 631 (S.C. 2000). 
 110. See, e.g., Paul Ingram & Hayagreeva Rao, Store Wars: The Enactment and 
Repeal of Anti-Chain-Store Legislation in America, 110 AM. J. SOC. 2, 447 (2004), 
available at http://www.columbia.edu/~pi17/ingram_rao.pdf. 
 111. See Richard Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, 
and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 
1091–92 (2005). 
 112. See, e.g., Gregory L. Rosston et al., The Effect of Private Interests on Regu-
lated Retail and Wholesale Prices, 51 J.L. & ECON. 479 (2008), available at http:// 
www.colorado.edu/Economics/people/JLE_in_press.pdf. 
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quirements do not necessarily amount to hard budget constraints in 
an era in which restrictions on debt have been eviscerated and many 
of the rewards that can be used to consolidate political gains, such as 
pensions, can be deferred to future budgets.113  Moreover, the moni-
toring incentives created by those hard budget constraints that remain 
still require a more robust interest group competition than exists in 
most localities.  At the extreme, local officials may ignore some po-
tential interest groups or seek affirmatively to drive those constitu-
ents from the locality in order to entrench political power among res-
idents who remain.114  Even short of the extreme, local officials can 
circumvent monitors by proposing projects on a take-it-or-leave-it ba-
sis at a cost that exceeds what the median voter would deem optimal, 
but by an amount less than what the median voter would bear to 
abandon the project.115  Alternatively, it may be in the interest of 
groups to increase aggregate spending if the marginal effect is to in-
crease their share of the collective pie.  The result is a form of logroll-
ing in which representatives trade for highly localized expenditures 
that benefit the groups most important to their political success, even 
though the proposed project imposes net costs on the locality as a 
whole.  This appears to be one explanation for Baqir’s observation 
that increasing the size of the local legislative body increases the size 
of government.116  Even short of that objective, some potential inter-
ests will be too small or diffuse or unable to organize to compete for a 
share of the budget or, more importantly, to contest inefficient claims 
on budget. 
The costs of monitoring for the median voter might be decreasing 
as technological advances enhance the fiscal transparency of locali-
ties.  With increasing frequency, major cities post their budgets on 
websites.117  But those budgets can be too opaque to facilitate the 
 
 113. See Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and 
State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 923 (2003); Richard Schragger, De-
mocracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 869 (2012).  
 114. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics 
of Shaping the Electorate, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 (2005). 
 115. See Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the 
Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy, 93 Q. J. ECON. 563, 
575–76 (1979).  For an application of the Romer-Rosenthal hypothesis to local initia-
tives, see Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 365, 396–97 (2004). 
 116. See, e.g., Reza Baqir, Districting and Government Overspending, 110 J. POL. 
ECON. 1318, 1351 (2002). 
 117. See, e.g., Office of Budget Management, CITY OF BOSTON, http://www.cityof 
boston.gov/budget/ (last visited June 4, 2012); Office of Management and Budget, 
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kind of monitoring that allows examination and evaluation of indi-
vidual expenditures.  First, it can be difficult to decipher the nature of 
expenditures or appropriations.118  Second, even if one knows the line 
item expenditures in the budget, it can be difficult to gauge the pro-
priety of any given expenditure.  Unlike firms, in which comparisons 
in expenditures for various goods and services may be informative, 
the geographic and financial position of any locality is likely to limit 
the utility of expenditure comparisons.  What one city spends per 
teacher or per sanitation worker relative to the expenditures of other 
cities may be probative of fiscal propriety, but it may also reflect la-
bor market conditions in different geographic areas or other features 
less connected to fiscal propriety.  Within public labor markets, com-
parisons to private sector employees in similar occupations provide a 
great deal of ammunition for analysis.119  But even if academic ana-
lysts invest in obtaining the relevant data, it is less certain that the 
electorate has the incentive or capacity to determine whether labor 
costs are higher than they “should” be or to determine whether fiscal 
distress is imminent given obligations for personnel wages, health 
costs, and pensions. 
Of course, not all residents will find the costs of monitoring prohib-
itive.  The market for politics will give political opponents an incen-
tive to detect misfeasance of incumbents and to publicize it to resi-
dents.  Local media also has incentives to discover budgetary 
scandals.  As I write this Article, The New York Times reports that 
the Brooklyn Borough President runs a series of charities that have 
received substantial contributions from developers, financial institu-
tions, and corporations with interests in local legislation and building 
projects.120  But it is less clear that investigations of individual scan-
 
CITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/obm.html (last visited 
June 4, 2012); Office of Management and Budget, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov 
/html/omb/html/publications/publications.shtml (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 118. For example, is Boston’s 2012 snow removal budget of $17,059,444 inclusive 
of equipment, sand and salt, and labor costs, or are some of those factors included 
elsewhere in the budget? See Public Works & Transportation Budget 2012, CITY OF 
BOSTON, 
http://www.cityofboston.gov/Images_Documents/09%20Public%20Works%20%26%
20Transportation%20Cabinet%20A_tcm3-24788.pdf (last visited June 4, 2012).   
 119. See, e.g., Kenneth J. McDonnell, Benefit Cost Comparisons Between State 
and Local Governments and Private-Sector Employers, 29 EBRI NOTES 2 (2008), 
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_Notes_06-2008.pdf. 
 120. See Liz Robbins & Allison Leigh Cowan, From Brooklyn Office, Mixing 
Clout and Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/ 
nyregion/for-brooklyn-leader-marty-markowitz-mix-of-business-charity-and-
power.html?_r=1&hp.   
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dals or defalcations provide the electorate with a low-cost overview of 
possible budgetary distress or overextension of borrowing.  For ex-
ample, as bonds issued to assist New York City during its fiscal crisis 
of the 1970s were maturing a few years ago, the city found itself in 
another downturn that made payment of the debt difficult.121  The 
state and the city approved a complicated but controversial plan to 
extend the maturity of the debt from 2008 to 2034, effectively impos-
ing on city residents in the latter year the obligation to pay debts in-
curred in 1978.122  Although the plan, which funneled funds through 
multiple state and city agencies and committed the city to the pay-
ment of $5.1 billion over thirty years, was challenged as violating state 
constitutional limitations on debt incurred by the state and the city, 
The New York Times contained but a single article about the issue, 
and made no mention of the Court of Appeals proceedings that re-
solved the issue.123  Perhaps complex financing arrangements, even 
those that have substantial implications for municipal budgets, do not 
provide sufficiently sensational reading material outside the arcane 
bond community. 
The general problem of monitoring, then, is that those who find it 
worthwhile to engage in the enterprise do not necessarily have inter-
ests that align with that part of the electorate that fails to monitor.  
Potential political opponents monitor for salient defalcations that 
might generate votes; media monitors for salient scandals that might 
sell newspapers; interest groups monitor to ensure that their favored 
projects are sufficiently funded.  Those groups are unlikely to have 
interests that align well with monitoring the budget as a whole to de-
termine whether the municipality has become overextended.  Indeed, 
as I indicated above, the variety of interests that seek simultaneous 
satisfaction is more likely to generate a situation in which political of-
 
 121. Michael Cooper, Going Against Governor, Mayor Plans to Sell Bonds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/13/nyregion/going-against-
governor-mayor-plans-to-sell-bonds.html. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Al Baker, Pataki Blocks Deal Crucial to City Plan to End Fiscal Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/07/nyregion/pataki-blocks-
deal-crucial-to-city-plan-to-end-fiscal-crisis.html?scp=2&sq=lgac&st=cse.  The Times 
did write an article about the Appellate Division decision in the case, but not about 
the subsequent Court of Appeals decision. See Michael Cooper & Al Baker, Court 
Backs Plan for State to Repay City’s Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2004), http://www.ny 
times.com/2004/03/05/nyregion/court-backs-plan-for-state-to-repay-city-s-debt.html? 
scp=1&sq=court%20of%20appeals%20local%20government%20assistance&st=cse.  
The relevant case is Local Gov’t Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Asset Receivable 
Corp., 813 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 2004).  
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ficials who want to be attentive to the myriad demands made by con-
stituents are likely to exploit means of increasing the size of the budg-
et pie rather than to foster competition for a fixed pie.  Borrowing, 
and subsequent overextension of the local treasury, becomes a major 
mechanism for achieving that function.  Ideally, residents would mon-
itor against excessive indebtedness.  But the combination of politics 
and inability to overcome collective action problems means that resi-
dent efforts will consistently fall far short of that ideal. 
B. Creditors as Substitute Monitors 
Are bondholders able to fill the gap in monitoring against fiscal dis-
tress?  If so, then it might be desirable to induce them to take ad-
vantage of that position by imposing losses on them in the event dis-
tress forces a choice between satisfying residents and bondholders.  
This is not to deny that bondholders could alter that position contrac-
tually or that bondholders would retain the implicit threat to impose 
higher interest costs on municipalities if they took a higher risk of 
nonpayment.  But if bondholders are, indeed, better positioned to de-
tect and deter those risks than are residents, then any higher interest 
payments would reflect the superior allocation of the risk. 
It is not clear that bondholders can serve as effective substitutes for 
non-monitoring residents.  Many of the characteristics that discourage 
resident monitoring apply with equal force to creditors.  Although 
creditors will be smaller in number than residents, they are likely to 
be sufficiently numerous and diffuse to create collective action prob-
lems, since monitoring is no less of a public good with respect to 
bondholders than it is with respect to residents.  Thus, no bondholder 
who can free ride on the efforts of others has an incentive to monitor 
personally.  Trustees for bondholders, who may solve collective ac-
tion problems related to matters such as distribution of funds or liti-
gation when defaults materialize, are not typically charged with pre-
default monitoring.124  Nor is there reason to believe that institutions 
that serve as trustees necessarily have the resources or expertise to 
assume monitoring obligations.125 
Bondholders might have greater monitoring capacity if they repre-
sented primarily large institutions whose investments warranted the 
costs of investigation.  But the world of bondholding appears not to 
 
 124. See Bond Trustees, PUBLIC BONDS, http://www.publicbonds.org/major_play 
ers/trustees.htm (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 125. See id. 
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be dominated by those types.  The Investment Company Institute re-
ports that individuals hold about thirty-five percent of municipal 
bonds directly, and another thirty-six percent indirectly through 
funds.126  Moreover, as I discuss below, even institutional bondholders 
that hold large amounts of a particular locality’s bonds in their portfo-
lio may eschew monitoring in favor of lower cost strategies for deal-
ing with fiscal risks. 
Even if municipal creditors have the capacity to overcome the col-
lective action problem, two questions remain.  First, are there other 
reasons to question whether they will incur the costs of monitoring?  
Second, if they monitor, will their interests align with those of resi-
dents sufficiently to say that they are acting as surrogates for the lat-
ter? 
Begin with the first question.  Creditors cannot be expected to 
monitor unless the personal benefits they realize from that effort off-
set their monitoring costs and no lower-cost alternatives exist.  Credi-
tors whose holdings may be otherwise sufficiently large to warrant 
monitoring are also likely to be well-positioned to employ other strat-
egies that reduce their exposure to debtor default.127  Most obviously, 
institutional creditors can reduce their risks by diversifying their in-
vestments.128  In addition, and notwithstanding the current distress of 
monoline insurers in the municipal bond industry,129 issuers frequent-
ly market bonds with insurance, so that bondholders are essentially 
buying the credit of the insurer, not the issuer, and are corresponding-
ly discouraged from monitoring the issuer.130  Insurers themselves 
may be thought to monitor in order to reduce their own risk, but it is 
equally or more plausible that they will manage risk through diversifi-
cation.  Creditors may prefer these strategies because the historic low 
incidence of default in the municipal market131 means that the ex-
pected losses that would materialize from failure to monitor are so 
 
 126. See Frequently Asked Questions About Municipal Bonds, INVESTMENT CO. 
INSTITUTE, http://www.ici.org/policy/markets/domestic/faqs_muni_bond (last visited 
June 4, 2012).   
 127. For fuller discussion of these points, see supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 128. Cf. WILBUR G. LEWELLEN, THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT 
(1971). 
 129. For a description of the difficulties suffered by some monoline insurers that 
invested in derivatives, see, for example, Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the 
Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial 
Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 25–30 (2010).   
 130. See, e.g., AFGI’s The Basics, AFGI, www.afgi.org/who-fact.htm (last visited 
June 4, 2012). 
 131. See, e.g., infra notes 139–40. 
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low as to question the cost-effectiveness of monitoring.  Seligman re-
ports that the default rate on municipal bonds from 1983 to 1988 was 
0.7%, while the default rate for corporate debt was 1.1%.132  A Re-
port of the House of Representatives Committee on Financial Ser-
vices, which considered the Municipal Bond Fairness Act of 2008, 
concluded that default rates for municipal bonds were significantly 
lower than default rates for corporate bonds of the same rating.133  
The Report found the following comparison of cumulative historic 
default rates (in percent) for municipal and corporate borrowers.134 
 
Losses that result in the event of default may also diminish the in-
centives of at least some municipal creditors to monitor.  While credi-
tors of municipalities typically cannot seize tangible assets of the 
debtor in the event of default, creditors secured by specific revenue 
 
 132. Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to 
the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 699 
(1995).      
 133. H.R. REP. NO. 110-835 (2008), MUNICIPAL BOND FAIRNESS ACT, 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-110hrpt835/pdf/CRPT-110hrpt835. 
pdf.  Default rates vary dramatically among bonds of different quality.  One re-
searcher estimated that for municipal bonds issued between 1979 and 1994, invest-
ment grade municipal bonds had default rates of 0.31 to 0.3%.  Below investment 
grade bonds had estimated default rates of 3.05 to 4.06%.  A 1997 study of a ten-year 
period for corporate bonds revealed defaults rates ranging from .06% for AAA rat-
ings to 3.27% for BBB ratings.  Below that, rates of 18.09% for BB ratings, 34.99% 
for B ratings and 56.65% for bonds with CCC ratings. See David Litvack, Are Munic-
ipal Bonds Rated Too Low?, 18th Annual Institute on Municipal Finance Regula-
tion, Compliance & Enforcement, 1162 PLI/CORP 479, 498 (2000).  Finally, default 
risk varies with issuers.  From 1980 through April 1999, there were no defaults by 
state governments. Id. at 483.  Approximately 60% by dollar volume of municipal 
bond defaults were attributable to local authorities, 20% to state authorities, and 
19% to municipalities. Id. at 483. 
 134. H.R. REP. NO. 110-835, supra note 133, at 5. 
 
Rating categories Moody’s  S&P  
Muni Corp Muni Corp 
Aaa/AAA .................................................................................................................. 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.60 
Aa/AA ...................................................................................................................... 0.06 0.52 0.00 1.50 
A/A .......................................................................................................................... 0.03 1.29 0.23 2.91 
Baa/BBB ................................................................................................................. 0.13 4.64 0.32 10.29 
Ba/BB ..................................................................................................................... 2.65 19.12 1.74 29.93 
B/B  ......................................................................................................................... 11.86 43.34 8.48 53.72 
Caa–C/CCC–C ........................................................................................................ 16.58 69.18 44.81 69.19 
Investment Grade ................................................................................................... 0.07 2.09 0.20 4.14 
Non-Invest Grade ................................................................................................... 4.29 31.37 7.37 42.35 
All  ........................................................................................................................... 0.10 9.70 0.29 12.98 
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streams may have somewhat greater leverage.135  Creditors who have 
received a pledge of certain revenues are entitled to priority with re-
spect to those revenues even in bankruptcy, a preference that reduces 
the need to monitor against anything other than the demise of the 
source of those revenues.136 
The second question suggests that, even if some creditors do moni-
tor, this may not replace resident monitoring because the interests of 
the groups overlap only imperfectly.  Unlike residents who, at least 
outside of small localities, are likely to have heterogeneous prefer-
ences about municipal expenditures, creditors have a common objec-
tive—they want to be paid.  Monitoring costs for bondholders, there-
fore, are lower than those for residents in the sense that the former 
are less concerned with the multiplicity of plausible municipal objec-
tives that can obfuscate the utility of local expenditures and thus raise 
the costs of monitoring for good government.  Bondholders will be 
less interested in specific expenditures and more concerned with the 
overall fiscal health of the municipality.  In that sense, they plausibly 
could serve as substitutes for residents with similar interests, although 
they will be less effective as substitutes for residents’ preferences 
about the particular bundle of goods and services that the municipali-
ty offers.  For bondholders, fiscal health means little more than the 
capacity to avoid default on principal and interest payments.  A mu-
nicipality that operates inefficiently or that faces fiscal distress of a 
sort that does not implicate the security of outstanding bonds (such as 
loss of a revenue source to which bondholders do not have access) 
may be of substantial interest to residents, but will not be a focal 
point of monitoring even by creditors who decide to undertake that 
effort. 
Divergent interests are likely to be even more prominent where the 
debt is secured by a subset of municipal revenues or by revenues gen-
erated by the project financed with bond proceeds rather than, as in 
the case of a general obligation bond, the general revenues of the 
municipality.  Holders of general obligation bonds are unlikely to 
consider the propriety of a particular project financed with such 
bonds, as long as they believe that the municipality will have suffi-
cient resources from which it can draw to pay debt service.  Residents, 
for instance, may prefer not to fund a new public library if they faced 
significant opportunity costs.  Residents, therefore, would presumably 
 
 135. See David M. Eisenberg, Creditors’ Remedies in Municipal Default, 1976 
DUKE L.J. 1363 (1976). 
 136. 11 U.S.C. § 928(a).   
GILLETTE_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:22 AM 
668 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
monitor budgetary constraints, but for the collective action problem.  
Since the debt incurred for the project is likely secured by the faith 
and credit of the borrower,137 creditors are less likely to scrutinize the 
decision to construct a new library.  One might believe that creditors 
would, at the least, examine the financial feasibility of the library and 
the contracting process to ensure that statutory bidding procedures 
were followed, and thus minimize the risk that their loan would sub-
sequently be invalidated, although bond counsel opinions on validity 
will typically displace the need for inquiry by creditors.138  To the ex-
tent that those procedures serve as proxies for local need for the li-
brary, one might infer that creditor scrutiny advanced the interests of 
residents.  But creditors are unlikely to be concerned about the effec-
tiveness or propriety of specific projects that do not threaten the 
availability of revenues sufficient to pay debt service.  Indeed, any 
concern bondholders might have for fiscal impropriety related to cor-
ruption is diluted by the fact that creditors are likely entitled to pay-
ment, even if there exists an illegality in the underlying contractual re-
lations between the locality and those involved in the project.139 
Holders of revenue bonds are even less likely to serve as surrogates 
for residents.  Those bonds are typically funded through collection of 
user fees and service charges rather than taxes.  Bondholders are un-
likely to be concerned about the general operation of the municipali-
ty, as long as the project in which they have an interest is financially 
healthy, or at least capable of generating revenues.  As I noted above, 
creditors who receive a pledge of special revenues have even less in-
centive to monitor the locality generally, because that pledge survives 
even bankruptcy filings. 
The divergence of interests between municipal creditors and resi-
dents means that the former are unlikely to police against the types of 
 
 137. For examples of projects funded by general obligation bonds, see the City of 
Albuquerque’s website for a summary of their 2011–2020 decade plan sections, avail-
able at http://www.cabq.gov/cip/2011-go-bond-program-and-2011-2020-decade-plan/ 
2011-2020-decade-plan-sections. 
 138. For a discussion of the circumstances under which municipal debt may be in-
validated for failure to adhere to statutory or constitutional requirements, see 
AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 18, at 290–314. 
 139. Section 8-202(b)(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a security 
issued by a governmental subdivision that is issued with a defect going to its validity 
will be valid in the hands of a good faith purchaser for value if it has been issued for a 
substantial consideration and for a purpose for which the issuer has power to borrow 
the security.  Even if the underlying violation would otherwise invalidate the bond, 
itself a questionable proposition, the typical recital by the issuer that there has been 
compliance with statutory requirements will estop the issuer from using the violation 
to avoid payment. See U.C.C. § 8-202(a).   
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fiscal imprudence that led to the adoption of state constitutional re-
strictions on municipal debt.  Consider, for instance, the concerns that 
underlie the public purpose doctrine: if localities are not constrained 
in the purposes for which they issue debt, they are likely to invest in 
projects that benefit discrete groups140 or that skew market forces by 
involving government in enterprises more appropriately reserved to 
private firms.141  But creditors who care only about prospects for re-
payment may be unconcerned about the propriety of public/private 
cooperation or the extent to which scarce local resources are misdi-
rected to one project at the expense of alternatives. 
Indeed, in some situations, the interests of creditors could be anti-
thetical to those of residents.  If this is the case, then—far from aug-
menting residents’ monitoring—monitoring by creditors could actual-
ly exacerbate the problem by inducing officials to address creditor 
concerns that conflict with those of residents.  Conflict between the 
interests of creditors and residents is always plausible.  In part, that 
conflict arises from the incentives of debtors to use borrowed funds 
for riskier projects than creditors might prefer, because the latter re-
ceive no benefit from the increased risk.  Creditors would prefer to 
see their debtors undertake relatively riskless projects that ensure re-
payment of the debt, even if the expected value of a riskier project 
exceeds that of the riskless project.142  In the municipal context, this 
might mean, for instance, that creditors would prefer that a housing 
project initially intended to benefit a mix of the poor and the elderly 
contain a larger percentage of the latter (because the elderly may be 
seen as more stable and willing to maintain the value of their resi-
dence), even though the locality has greater needs to accommodate 
the interests on the nonelderly poor.  This example reflects that resi-
 
 140. State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 27 S.C. 323, 328 (1981).   
 141. Vill. of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 353 P.2d 767, 775 (Idaho 1960).  
For this reason, the public purpose doctrine may be applicable to revenue bonds, 
even though they do not implicate the issuer’s fiscal status.  Alternatively, the doc-
trine may apply to revenue bonds because those debts may implicate the issuer’s fis-
cal status even though the issuer is not responsible for payment of debt service. See 
AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 18, at 87–90. 
 142. Assume, for instance, that a creditor makes a loan of $100.  The firm expects 
to use the proceeds of the loan to implement Project A or Project B.  Project A has a 
0.9 probability of returning $120 and a 0.1 probability of returning $50.  Thus, Project 
A has an expected value of $113.  Project B has a 0.5 probability of returning $1000 
and a 0.5 probability of returning $0.  Thus, Project B has an expected value of $500.  
Hence, risk neutral equity holders would prefer Project B.  But the creditor receives 
no more than $100 regardless of the firm’s success.  Thus, it faces an expected recov-
ery of $95 from Project A (0.9 of $100 + 0.1 of $50) and an expected value of $50 
from Project B (0.5 of $100 + 0.5 of $0).  Hence, the holder will favor Project A.   
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dents are properly concerned about issues other than (or in addition 
to) the financial security of their locality, and might be willing to sac-
rifice that security for other objectives.  To the extent that efficient 
delivery of municipal services could mean denying those services to 
residents who could not pay their marginal cost, pricing schemes that 
require subsidies or that encourage overuse might place the municipal 
treasury at a risk that residents believe is worth taking from a distri-
butional perspective.  Creditors, on the other hand, will desire only to 
maximize the probability of repayment. 
C. Surrogates for Bondholders 
To this point, I have suggested that bondholders are unlikely to 
serve as substitute monitors for residents because bondholders have 
superior low-cost alternatives for protecting their investments, face 
low probability of losses and thus face relatively high monitoring 
costs, and have interests that diverge from those of residents.  But 
“bondholder” monitoring does not necessarily entail monitoring by 
bondholders as a class.  Just as creditors might, in theory at least, 
serve as surrogates for residents, so may a subset of creditors or their 
representatives (a term that I do not mean to use in a legal sense) 
serve as surrogates for the larger group.  If a subgroup of creditors 
has sufficient incentives or obligations to monitor against general fis-
cal distress, then it may confer benefits on the larger group and on 
other groups (residents) as well.  Is there any reason, then, to con-
clude that a subset of creditors or representatives of creditors are bet-
ter situated to monitor against fiscal distress than are residents? 
If collective action problems impede creditor monitoring, but mon-
itoring is worthwhile to creditors as a group, then one might imagine 
that intermediaries who are able to monitor on behalf of the group 
and recoup their investment might evolve to fill the gap.  Intermediar-
ies that could, at relatively low cost, make investigations that are not 
worth making for individual investors, would presumably be able to 
market information discovered from their inquiries to investors who 
would be willing to bear a pro rata share of the search costs.  Alterna-
tively, intermediaries could market their services to municipalities, 
which could signal their quality by including the imprimatur of the in-
termediary.  In theory, rating agencies fit this description.  Standard 
& Poor’s, for instance, describes an intense investigatory process in 
which its representatives meet with municipal officials, peruse and 
analyze financial records of the municipality, submit information to a 
committee that assigns ratings, review appeals by municipalities, re-
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view outstanding ratings at the time of a new issue sale of a previously 
rated entity, and monitor disclosure events and public filings to de-
termine the existence of financial, legal, and natural events that might 
affect credit quality.143  If rating agencies fulfilled these goals, they 
might serve functions equivalent to those of active monitors.  For 
purposes of developing and publicizing information concerning debt-
ors, the position of rating agencies is analogous to that of unsecured 
creditors who engage in pre-loan screening of firms.  Barry Adler 
notes that even if unsecured creditors do not monitor loans ex post, 
they are likely to engage in broad pre-loan screening of firm assets, 
including those, such as managerial skill, with little encumberable 
value in order to assess the risk of the loan.144  Subsequent grant of 
the loan on terms less favorable than expected may provide current 
and potential equity holders with a signal of mismanagement, while 
favorable terms may constitute a signal of quality on which others can 
rely.145  Pre-loan screening generates sufficient benefits for unsecured 
creditors that they are willing to generate information on which oth-
ers can free ride.  Rating agencies do not obtain any personal value 
from their investigations, as they are not proposing to lend to the en-
tities for which they provide ratings.146  But they are able to capture 
the benefit of the information they provide to third parties by charg-
ing municipalities for the costs of investigation,147 and municipalities 
receive sufficient benefit from obtaining those ratings that they are 
willing to incur those costs.  In this manner, rating agencies can theo-
retically signal bondholders about any general indicators of fiscal dis-
tress. 
Individual instances of pre-loan screening by rating agencies do not 
constitute monitoring because the inquiry takes place only at a single 
point—prior to the issuance of a series of bonds.  But many munici-
 
 143. See Standard & Poor’s Guide to Credit Rating Essentials, STANDARD & 
POOR’S, https://www.mycreditprofile.standardandpoors.com/mysp/myspservlet?requ 
estName=DownloadHotTopics&blobIdParam=YYYXYXXYYXY (last visited June 
4, 2012).  
 144. See Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to The Bankruptcy-Priority 
Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 91–94 (1993).   
 145. Id.  
 146. See Standard & Poor’s Ratings Definitions, STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www. 
standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245328
288201.  
 147. See Zeke Faux, Credit Rating Fees Rise Faster Than Inflation as Govern-
ments Downgraded, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2011-11-15/credit-rating-fees-rise-faster-than-inflation-as-governments-
fret-expenses.html. 
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palities require recurrent access to the credit markets.  General pur-
pose municipalities and some authorities (such as housing authorities 
and industrial development authorities) fund multiple projects on an 
ongoing basis.148  As the description of Standard & Poor’s149 suggests, 
each entry into the credit markets is likely to trigger a new evaluation 
by rating agencies.  If rating requirements are sufficiently frequent, 
they become the functional equivalent of monitoring while a loan is 
outstanding.  Notwithstanding that we would now have an additional 
layer of principal-agent slippage (residents relying on creditors who 
are relying on rating agencies), under certain circumstances,150 the in-
terests of all interested parties should be sufficiently aligned to pro-
vide reliable signals of municipal fiscal quality. 
Nevertheless, one must be skeptical of the capacity or willingness 
of rating agencies to perform this function.  Even before the most re-
cent financial crisis, rating agencies were frequently criticized for their 
failure to add significantly to public information concerning the cor-
porations and municipalities that they reviewed.151  On this view, ra-
ther than discovering and distilling information that permits more in-
formed decisions by investors, rating agencies simply react to infor-
information that is already known to the marketplace.  Consider, for 
instance, John Coffee’s critique of the market’s ability to rely on rat-
ings to displace disclosure of information directly to investors in mu-
nicipal securities: 
First, in the New York City fiscal crisis, Moody’s did not reduce New 
York’s rating until the crisis was universally acknowledged.  Second, 
because the issuer pays the bond rating agency to be rated, there is a 
conflict of interest problem.  Third, the bond rating agencies are not 
themselves investigating agencies. Instead, they depend on the data 
that the issuer gives them.  Yet a recent survey by Arthur Young & 
Co., the auditing firm, suggests that this data’s accuracy is in serious 
 
 148. See, e.g., 2010 Annual Report, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING & URBAN DEVEL-
OPMENT CORP., https://www.nychdc.com/content/pdf/AnnualReports/Annual%20Re 
port%202010.pdf (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 149. Understanding Standard & Poor’s Rating Definitions, STANDARD & POOR’S, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/delivery/assets/files/Understanding_Rating_D
efinitions.pdf (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 150. The requisite circumstances will exist if municipalities frequently enter capital 
markets, make observable covenants, and are funding projects, the failure of which 
would signify general fiscal distress within the locality. 
 151. See, e.g., L. MACDONALD WAKEMAN, THE REAL FUNCTION OF BOND RATING 
AGENCIES, IN THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 391 (Michael C. Jen-
sen & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1984); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Fi-
nancial Markets? Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 619, 647–48 (1999). 
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doubt.  In a 1983 survey of 557 municipalities, it found that fifty-four 
percent of the municipalities issued financial reports that were so in-
complete or flawed that their independent accountants could give 
only qualified opinions.  In part, these problems may stem from the 
still rudimentary state of the accounting principles applicable to 
governmental and nonprofit bodies.  The bottom line, however, is 
that if ratings are based on poor data, they will not protect investors 
who desire to avoid high risk: garbage in, garbage out.152 
Certainly little has happened since Coffee wrote to improve the 
perception of rating agency performance, at least in the private sector 
adversely affected by the recent fiscal crisis.153  If rating agencies are 
simply serving as filters for publicly available information, or are 
simply conduits for governmentally-created information, then their 
role falls far from the monitoring function that their literature sug-
gests they play. 
But independent intermediaries are not the only potential surro-
gates for bondholder monitoring.  Perhaps those more directly in-
volved in bond issuance, primarily underwriters, may serve the inter-
ests of the full range of creditors.  Underwriters have the incentive of 
all creditors to monitor because they typically purchase an entire 
bond issue and frequently retain significant amounts of the issue in 
their own portfolio.  In addition, underwriters can take advantage of 
legal defenses against liability for nondisclosure if they exercise due 
diligence with respect to certain representations in offering docu-
ments.154  In effect, the due diligence requirements that the law al-
ready imposes on them155 means that they have already sunk costs in-
to monitoring.  Again, these obligations may exist only with respect to 
pre-loan screening, but for repeat players in the credit markets, con-
tinual ex ante screening may be tantamount to ex post monitoring.  
Those incentives are enhanced by the SEC’s adoption of Rule 15c2-
 
 152. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 745–46 (1984).  Coffee’s last criticism may be 
less relevant now than when he stated it.  Increasingly, municipal accounting systems 
have been regularized to permit easier comprehension by professionals and investors.  
In addition, as I discuss below, federal securities laws now induce localities to make 
more comprehensive financial disclosure than was previously the case. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12.   
 153. See, e.g., Lynn Bai, The Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: 
Are They Effective Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 47 (2010); Claire 
A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 
71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585 (2010). 
 154. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(b)(3). 
 155. See 15 U.S.C. § 77. 
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12.156  This rule prohibits brokers, dealers, and municipal securities 
dealers from purchasing or selling municipal securities unless they 
reasonably believe that the state or local government issuing the secu-
rities has agreed to disclose certain financial information on an ongo-
ing basis.157  Although the rule is nominally directed at brokers and 
dealers in municipal debt offerings, it effectively requires underwrit-
ers to enter contractual relationships with issuers to provide the re-
quired financial information in accessible formats.158  That infor-
mation includes general information concerning the issuer, as well as 
financial information related to specific events that indicate impend-
ing fiscal distress, such as payment delinquencies, non-payment de-
faults, unscheduled draws on debt service reserves or credit en-
hancements, bond calls, and rating changes.159 
This is not to suggest that underwriters are at fault when they facili-
tate the issuance of debt that is risky or with respect to which there 
has been a default.  Instead, if the objective in assigning priorities to 
limited funds in the event of default takes into account the relative 
capacity of the relevant actors to monitor against fiscal distress, the 
fact that underwriters who market bonds have both legal and finan-
cial incentives to access the appropriate information indicates that 
bondholders may be better positioned to identify impending fiscal 
distress than residents.  To the extent that the interests of underwrit-
ers monitoring for disclosure aligns with monitoring against financial 
irresponsibility generally, those involved in the issuance process serve 
as surrogates for residents at zero marginal cost.  As a result, in a hy-
pothetical bargain between bondholders and residents, the latter 
would pay bondholders to subordinate priority, since bondholders’ 
representatives could assess the default risk at lower cost.  Moreover, 
since evidence of fiscal distress unearthed during the due diligence 
process is likely to translate into higher interest rates that underwrit-
ers either negotiate with issuers or incorporate into their bids for a 
competitively bid issue, bondholders are compensated to take the de-
fault risk and have less basis for complaint about receiving lower pri-
ority than residents. 
Indeed, to the extent that underwriters’ interests are aligned with 
those of bondholders generally, subordinating bondholders’ claims to 
those of residents could have the additional positive effect of reducing 
 
 156. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2010). 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
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underwriters’ incentives to incur debt that could exacerbate fiscal dis-
tress.160  That point was made seventy-five years ago by A. M. 
Hillhouse, who contended that investment bankers encourage the is-
suance of bonds, including unnecessary ones, in order to maintain 
business volumes that may have developed during times of prosperity 
and to capture clients before competitors have an opportunity to do 
so.161  He then turned to the incentives of these investors: 
Trafficking in the “shame of the cities” [the overextension of debt] 
might also be laid in part at the investor’s door.  Both the high inter-
est rates on doubtful municipals and the tax-exempt feature appeal 
to his desire for profit . . . . High rates of interest may seem uncon-
scionable, but where the initiative was taken by the borrowers, the 
investor cannot be condemned.  Rates must vary with the quality of 
the credit.  Unfortunately, however, like all lenders, the investor in 
municipal bonds may subsequently seek to reap even though he has 
unwisely or recklessly sown.162 
The exposure of those involved in the bond issuance process to fis-
cal information, and thus their capacity to constrain risky issuance, is 
apparent from accounts of those issues that have proven problematic 
or that ended up in default.  Even prior to the adoption of Rule 15c2-
12, underwriters had access to information that presaged fiscal dis-
tress.  Again, New York City provides an example that may be more 
salient due to the size and importance of that city in the national 
economy, but that may also be representative.  The SEC Staff Report 
that investigated issuance of New York City securities certainly casti-
gated city officials for the use of unsound accounting and reporting 
practices that obscured financial data about the city’s revenues, costs, 
 
 160. The current bankruptcy of Jefferson County, Alabama is frequently attributed 
to the issuance of bonds and related swap agreements that left the county with sub-
stantially greater than anticipated costs of developing a sewer system.  The compli-
cated arrangements were tarnished by allegations of bid rigging and bribery involving 
an underwriter and two of its managing directors.  The SEC entered into a settlement 
that required the underwriter to pay a penalty of $25 million, make a payment of $50 
million to Jefferson County, and forfeit more than $647 million in claimed termina-
tion fees. See Press Release, S.E.C., J.P. Morgan Settles SEC Charges in Jefferson 
County, Ala. Illegal Payments Scheme (Nov. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2009/dig120409.htm; Campbell Robertson & Mary 
Williams Walsh, Debt Crisis? Bankruptcy Fears? See Jefferson County, Ala., N.Y. 
TIMES (July 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/30/us/30jefferson.html?hp=& 
pagewanted=all. 
 161. HILLHOUSE, supra note 27.  Richard Schragger makes a similar point, which 
he attributes to Richard Briffault. See Schragger, supra note 111, at 871 n.40. 
 162. HILLHOUSE, supra note 27, at 254–55.  
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and financial position.163  But the Report also alleged that underwrit-
ers were aware of the burgeoning city debt, the limited capacity of the 
city to repay that debt, and their own impending incapacity to sell 
debt because of the city’s fiscal position and the saturation of the 
market with city securities.164  Similarly, both academic and official 
investigations of the issuance process for the nuclear power projects 
involved in the Washington Public Power Supply System defaults re-
veal substantial underwriter involvement in generating and publiciz-
ing the information that induced municipalities to participate and as-
sessing the financial viability of the projects that ultimately went 
awry.165  The SEC Staff Report on the matter concluded that even 
underwriters in competitive offerings who did not—unlike under-
writers in negotiated offerings—participate in the creation of disclo-
sure documents had knowledge of and concerns about problems re-
lating to project costs, power demand that would affect the rates 
payable by residents, and the market for the bonds.166 
CONCLUSION 
I am not using these instances of misbehavior in the bond issuance 
process to suggest that there is pervasive wrongdoing in the bond 
markets.  These instances are admittedly pathologies which, for that 
reason, have generated sufficient comment to reveal the extent to 
which those involved in bond issuance have access to financial infor-
mation about the issuer.  But the fact that they are pathologies is just 
the point.  In most cases, information to which underwriters have low-
cost access and that they are likely to obtain for reasons having noth-
ing to do with the assignment of priorities in the event of default is 
likely to be used appropriately to assess risks and price them.  The 
consequence is that bondholders receive the benefit of information 
that both they and residents might otherwise eschew.  But if that is 
the case, then assigning residents—who are less likely to obtain simi-
lar information—priority to limited municipal funds would appear to 
replicate the very bargain that bondholders and residents would reach 
 
 163. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF THE COMMISSION ON 
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STAFF REPORT ON 
TRANSACTION IN SECURITIES IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK ch. 3 (1977). 
 164. Id. ch. 4.  
 165. See S.E.C., STAFF REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION IN THE MATTER OF 
TRANSACTIONS IN WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM SECURITIES (1988), 
available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1980 
/1988_0901_SEC_WPPSS.pdf; POPE, supra note 71. 
 166. See S.E.C., supra note 165, at 177–90.   
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if they could negotiate.  Bondholders who have been compensated ex 
ante to take risks have little basis for complaint when those risks ma-
terialize.  The intervention of the state to elevate bondholders over 
residents may make political sense, but it misses this important ele-
ment of allocating the risk of municipal fiscal distress in a manner that 
reduces the likelihood that it will materialize. 
